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Teaching and Learning Islamic  
Law in a Globalized World: 
Some Reflections and Perspectives
Shaheen Sardar Ali
This paper is an attempt to highlight some questions and issues inherent in 
the conceptualisation, development, and delivery of Islamic law curricula in 
diverse jurisdictions and in an increasingly globalized academic environment. 
There exist significant challenges, both conceptual and methodological, for 
Islamic law teaching in Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions. In Muslim 
jurisdictions, it is imperative to move beyond an exclusively doctrinal, literal, 
and inflexible approach to teaching and learning Islamic law. To achieve this, 
instructors need to consciously evaluate the content of their courses as well as 
their classroom techniques. However, that approach presents somewhat of a 
dilemma: On the one hand Muslim academics endorse the dynamic and varied 
interpretations enriching the Islamic legal tradition by different schools of 
juristic thought. On the other hand, in reality, this diversity and dynamism does 
not translate to a tolerant intellectual environment in the academy and indeed 
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in life in general. In this article, I draw upon my own experiences teaching 
and researching Islamic law in both Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions, 
as well as on the views and opinions of Islamic law teachers in a number of 
jurisdictions, including Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, Continental Europe, and the United States. This paper has grown 
organically over a number of years through feedback and comments from 
students, colleagues, and participants at various workshops and conferences as 
part of an Islamic Law Curriculum Development Project. I suggest adopting 
a “law in context” approach to appreciate the inherent complexities and 
intricacies of Islamic law. I argue for adopting a rigorous methodology in the 
teaching and learning process by encouraging a critical engagement with the 
primary and secondary sources of the Islamic legal tradition. Simultaneously, 
this paper emphasizes how Islamic law teaching is “different” or “special” 
compared to subjects where “the law” consists of clearly defined articles of 
statute law. Finally, this paper advances the argument that teaching Islamic 
law offers the opportunity for imparting important lawyering skills, including 
developing coherent arguments from varying source materials, understanding 
the  plurality of views and opinions, analyzing legal norms, and sifting and 
extrapolating the legal from the moral, ethical and religious injunctions. A 
common theme running through this paper is the consciousness that law 
making based on a divine text (as is the case in Islamic law), is a human and 
not divine act and therefore open to challenge, debate and change. Contested 
and controversial as this approach is, it must form an integral component of 
any course on Islamic law.
Having taught various aspects of Islamic law for twenty-five years in a 
Muslim jurisdiction, I encountered some interesting challenges when I stepped 
out of my sheltered niche of Peshawar University in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 
Province1 of Pakistan and into international academic settings. Devising guest 
lectures, short courses, conferences and workshops, and undergraduate and 
postgraduate modules at a number of institutions outside the country of my 
birth put me on a steep learning and discovery curve. I found myself in turn 
surprised, challenged, fascinated, and enthused by significant differences 
underlying the conceptual, methodological, and pedagogical approaches 
employed in a university located in a country with a predominantly Muslim 
population and institutions in non-Muslim countries including the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and the United States. 
Like every discipline, Islamic law raises conceptual, methodological and 
pedagogical issues in terms of its teaching and learning processes. This paper 
seeks to identify and analyze some of these, with the proviso that issues raised 
here are not exhaustive but merely indicative of questions one may anticipate 
in the teaching and learning of Islamic law.
1. This province formerly known as the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) was re-
named as Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa through the recently enacted Eighteenth Constitutional 
Amendment adopted by the Pakistan Parliament in 2010.
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The Islamic Legal Tradition: Key Concepts and Terminology
One of the core concepts in the study of Islamic law is the Shari’a,2 both in 
terms of its centrality to the understanding of the Islamic legal tradition as well 
as the varying definitions ascribed to it. Shari’a is the overarching umbrella of 
rules, regulations, values, and normative framework covering all aspects and 
spheres of life for Muslims. It constitutes the divine injunctions of God (the 
Qur’an), divinely-inspired Sunna (words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
recorded as Hadith) as well as the human articulation and understanding of 
these sources.3 Shari’a is therefore not restricted to legal rules; it is informed 
by the divine and divinely inspired text, but not entirely so, and not static and 
immutable but dynamic and evolutionary in nature. 
Rahman states that:
At the very root of the Muslim conception of law lies the idea that law is 
inherently and essentially religious. That is why, from the beginning of Islamic 
history, law has been regarded as flowing from or being part of the concept of 
Shari’a (the divinely ordained pattern of human conduct).4 
Kamali too reiterates the divine and religious nature of Shari’a declaring 
that:
Notwithstanding the fact that human reason has always played an important 
role in the development of Shariah...the Shariah itself is primarily founded on 
divine revelations.5 
An-Naim is of the view that:
The term Shari’a refers to the general normative system of Islam as historically 
understood and developed by Muslim jurists, especially during the first three 
centuries of Islam—the eighth to tenth centuries CE. In this commonly used 
sense, Shari’a includes a much broader set of principles and norms than legal 
subject matter as such.6 
2. Readers will note that the term Shari’a is spelled differently by different authors (Shariah, 
Sharia’t). Unless quoting an author who may have spelled the word differently, this paper 
will use Shari’a as the standard spelling.
3. See Abdur Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Mansoor Book House 1995); Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3d ed. Islamic Texts Society 2003); 
Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (The Islamic Foundation 1999); A. R. I. Doi, 
Shari’ah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Pub. 1984); Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of  Muhammadan 
Law  (4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1974).
4. Fazlur Rahman, Islam (3d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press 1979).
5. Kamali, supra note 3, at xix.
6. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (ed.), Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global 
Resource Book 1–2 (Zed Press 2002). 
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Shari’a thus is more than black letter law and legal principles. It encompasses 
social, moral and ethical normativities affecting human lives.7 I suggest 
elsewhere that the phrase “principles of Islamic law” more appropriately 
captures the true breadth of this concept, as opposed to terming it immutable, 
unchangeable, and divine law, whereas the legal component of Shari’a is the 
“Islamic legal tradition” or “Islamic law” as it is commonly termed.8
The Islamic legal tradition includes primary sources such as the Qur’an9 and 
Sunna,10 and secondary sources, including Ijma (consensus of opinion)11 and 
Qiyas (analogical deduction).12 In addition, the range of juristic techniques 
includes Ijtihad (literally, striving hard and strenuously), which denotes 
exercising independent juristic reasoning to provide answers when the Qur’an 
and Sunna are silent on a particular issue.13 Taqlid (duty to follow) is considered 
by most students of Islamic law as mere “imitation,” to emulate or copy. As a 
term of jurisprudence, taqlid may be used in the context of accepting someone’s 
intellectual authority.14 While inhibiting independent legal formulations, 
taqlid allowed later jurists a choice from among variant views recorded in 
authoritative texts.15 
7. Id. at 68; A. Allot, The Limits of Law (Butterworths 1980); Fyzee, supra note 4; David Pearl 
& W. Menski, Muslim Family Law (3d ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1998).
8. I have developed the idea of the “operative” Islamic law as opposed to Shari’a in my book: 
Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal 
Before Allah, Unequal Before Man? (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2000).
9. The Qur’an is believed by Muslims to be the word of God and was revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel over a period of 22 years, 2 months and 22 days. It 
is divided into 114 chapters and has a total of 6,666 verses and 30 sections.
10. Sunna, meaning the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (and also known as 
traditions), are compiled as Hadith (singular) and Ahadith (plural). A tradition or Hadith is 
composed of the matn (text) of the tradition and the isnad (chain of transmitters). 
11. It is defined by Rahim as “agreement among the Muslim jurists in a particular age on a 
question of law.” Rahim, supra note 3, at 97. “Ijma is defined as the unanimous agreement of 
the mujtahidun of the Muslim community of any period following the demise of the Prophet 
Muhammad on any matter.” Kamali, supra note 3, at 230.
12. As a source of law Qiyas comes into operation in matters not covered by an express text of the 
Qur’an and Sunna nor dealt with by Ijma. The law deduced by application of what has already 
been laid down by the three sources is Qiyas. Rahim, supra note 3, at 117.
13. A person qualified to undertake Ijtihad is known as a Mujtahid and there are specific 
qualifications for a person to be so acknowledged.
14. Rahim, supra note 3, at 144–145; Noel James Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 80–81 
(Edinburgh Univ. Press 1994).
15. Coulson, supra note 14, at 182.
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Similarly, by applying the process or technique of ikhtilaf, or the “unity 
in diversity” doctrine, jurists of the various schools of thought as well 
as practitioners arrived at positions that were representative of diverse 
viewpoints.16 
Takhayyur means a process of selection and is a term of jurisprudence used to 
consider possible alternatives from a range of juristic opinions on a particular 
point of law, with the intention to apply the least restrictive legal principles 
to issues arising. Takhayyur has been of enormous significance in developing a 
number of women friendly codes of family laws in Muslim jurisdictions.17 
Talfiq, translated literally as “patchwork,” implies the process whereby 
Muslim jurists constructed legal rules by the combination and fusion of 
opinions derived from different schools of thought on a particular issue.18 
Maslaha (the public good or in the public interest) or masalihu’l-mursala 
wa’listislah is a doctrine propounded by Imam Malik who allowed “a deduction 
of law to be based on general considerations of the public good.”19 There 
is evidence that qadis (judges) and jurists in Muslim history have employed 
this concept to override problems arising out of adherence to strict doctrine 
enshrined in the classical legal texts. Darura (necessity/duress) is a technique 
applied where it becomes imperative to make prohibited things and situations 
permissible. Last but certainly not least in the catalogue of juristic techniques 
is custom or ‘urf as a source of law, also termed ta’amul or ‘adat.20
16. Id. at 86. This diversity is described by Coulson as being “as varied as the colors of the 
rainbow.”
17. For example, regarding circumstances where a married Muslim woman may seek dissolution 
of her marriage, the Hanafi School is restrictive whereas the Maliki is flexible and allows a 
wife to seek dissolution on the grounds of her husband’s cruelty. This was incorporated in 
a number of personal status laws in the Muslim world. Likewise, the Hanbali doctrine of 
abiding by stipulations (based on the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad) led this school of 
thought to declare that the marriage contract could stipulate the husband’s monogamy, 
the wife could choose the place of residence, and so on. Examples of Takhayyur include the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, the Moroccan Code of Personal Status 1858, 
Jordanian Law of Family Rights 1951, Syrian Law of Personal Rights 1953, the Ottoman Law 
of Family Rights 1917, and the latest, Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) 2004, among 
others.
18. An interesting example of talfiq is the Indian landmark case of Muhammad Ibrahim v. 
Gulam Ahmed (1864), where a girl brought up as a Shafi’i married without her father’s 
consent. When the case came up in court, she declared that she had chosen to change her 
school of juristic thought to the Hanafi School because Hanafi law allows an adult Muslim 
woman to marry without the consent of her guardian. 
19. Rahim, supra note 3, at 140; see also Coulson, supra note 14, at 144.
20. At times controversial, this source of law and juristic technique plays an important role 
in the growth of the Islamic legal tradition as it speaks to the commonly held beliefs and 
convictions of communities. Thus some communities of South Asia relied upon ‘urf to 
interpret Muslim laws of inheritance. 
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Students of Islamic law are also called upon to appreciate the difference 
between Shari’a, fiqh, and usul-ul-fiqh. According to Kamali:
The main difference between fiqh and usul-ul-fiqh is that the former is concerned 
with the knowledge of the detailed rules of Islamic law in its various branches, 
and the latter with the methods that are applied in the deduction of such rules 
from their sources. Fiqh, in other words, is the law itself, whereas usul-ul-fiqh is 
the methodology of the law.21 
The Definitional/Naming Dilemmas
Bearing in mind the vast array of terms and terminology employed in 
describing the Islamic legal tradition and its various branches, as well as the 
limitations of translating these from Arabic to English, one of the first issues 
to grapple with in constructing a course on the Islamic legal tradition relates 
to appropriate title and terminology. Do we describe it as Shari’a law, Muslim 
law, Islamic law, or Muhammadan law (recalling the colonial description)? 
Each of these course titles has implications for scholarship on the subject as 
well as content, pedagogy and delivery of the curriculum because the title 
also delineates its ideological underpinnings. A course entitled Shari’a Law for 
instance implies that Shari’a constitutes law in the sense of legally enforceable 
rules and akin to black letter law. But as we have noted above, law is only a 
component of Shari’a, which covers all aspects of human life, and such a course 
title would be misleading. Secondly, and more importantly, Shari’a law reflects 
the position that it is an all-encompassing normative framework of divine 
rules and hence immutable and unchangeable through human intellectual 
endeavour. This approach, of assuming Shari’a to comprise solely divine and 
unchangeable rules, though not necessarily inherent in the title, is prominent 
in Islamic law teaching in Muslim jurisdictions. In non-Muslim jurisdictions, 
however, the extent to which a course with this title and content fits within 
a law curriculum and, whether a better fit might be a program based in a 
department of theology, religious studies, or Islamic studies, becomes an open 
question. 
Muslim law, on the other hand, is a title that refers to those aspects of the law 
that are understood by Muslims to be Islamic law. But this understanding is 
not and cannot be uniform as Islamic law does not have a static, fixed content, 
since it is extrapolated from a range of sources by different juristic schools of 
thought in Islam. Broadly, these schools or madhab (plural madahab) as they are 
called, are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali (among Sunni Muslims), and 
Athna-Ashariya, Zaidya and Ismailia schools among Shia Muslims. Implicitly, 
the term reflects interpretative variations within the Islamic legal tradition as 
well as contemporary law reform in the Muslim world. For instance Hanafi 
Muslims do not require an adult Muslim woman to have the consent of her 
male guardian to enter into a valid contract of marriage whereas followers 
of the Maliki tradition present it as a legal requirement. Similarly, legal 
21. Kamali, supra note 3, at 2.
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practice in Muslim communities concerning what they believe to be “Islamic” 
also varies. An example is the practice (among predominantly South Asian 
Muslims) of divorce by a husband through three pronouncements without any 
space for reconciliation (commonly known as “triple talaq”). Such practice is 
not considered Islamically legal by Shia Muslims. Despite this more realistic 
description of the Islamic legal tradition, few courses on the subject have 
adopted the title, Muslim law.22
Finally, we come to Islamic law—the most widely used title for courses on 
the subject in Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions. Such a title describes a 
course based on the substance and methodology derived from the primary and 
secondary sources, the general teachings of Islam, the Shari’a as principles of 
legally enforceable law, and contemporary legislation of Muslim jurisdictions 
derived thereof. Defined in these terms, Islamic law encompasses not only 
the theoretical framework of Islamic law, but also the various interpretations 
of these sources as well as legislative enactments. A course titled Islamic Law 
invites some criticism on the basis that the title creates the expectation of a 
uniform body of regulatory norms in statutory formulation, a position few 
scholars on the subject would be willing to support. Islamic Law must combine 
jurisprudence (fiqh and usul-ul-fiqh) and law as one leads to the other. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the law in Islamic Law should not be understood as the 
authoritative voice of black letter law conceptualised in western legal systems, 
and which the course title appears to denote. 
In response to these observations, it is fair to note that courses based on the 
Islamic legal tradition invariably tend to include an element of contemporary 
legislation in Muslim jurisdictions based upon the Qur’an, Hadith as well as 
secondary and subsidiary sources of Islamic law. These courses thus present a 
combination of jurisprudence as well as its application and are not so far off 
the mark in the choice of title. The present paper uses Islamic law to define 
and describe scholarship derived from and based on principles of the Islamic 
legal tradition. I consciously use the term in order to include codification of 
these principles in contemporary Muslim jurisdictions.23
22. It is not within the scope of the present paper to interrogate why “Muslim law” does not find 
currency as a possible title, and it would require specific research to answer this question. I 
do believe that it is worth devoting time and thought to such an inquiry and an empirical 
study from a cross section of respondents across Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions may 
highlight some interesting responses. I raise this also as a pedagogical and methodological 
matter for teachers and students of the Islamic legal tradition.
23. My own module on the subject is entitled An Introduction to Islamic Law, arrived at after 
much thought and discussion with colleagues.
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Teaching Context and Methodology
For purposes of faculty in law schools, the critical question underpinning 
a course on Islamic law is: Does the fact that the sources of Islamic law are 
believed to be of divine origin affect the way the law should be taught?24 If so, 
how might one approach the subject? Students often confuse the teaching of 
Islam as a religious doctrine with Islamic law, i.e., the principles and body of 
legal rules based upon it. Islamic doctrine and Islamic law are indeed different 
and this difference needs to be considered pedagogically. What is the impact 
of this difference on teaching and learning processes within the discipline? 
For instance, if we are to teach the subject as part of a religious studies 
curriculum, both content and delivery is likely to cover the origins, history 
and evolution of Islam and Muslims, with less emphasis on the law-making 
process in the Islamic legal tradition. On the other hand, when located in 
law and social sciences (the focus of the present paper), instructors must use 
divine, and divinely inspired sources, i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith, as sources of a 
legal tradition hence opening them to critical engagement and analysis. Most 
English language scholarship on Islamic law devotes less space and discussion 
to usul-ul-fiqh and more to the history of Islamic law. Faculty using these as 
textbooks reflect similar trends and approaches. It is suggested that course 
content on Islamic law include methodology (usul) for deriving concrete and 
relevant legal doctrines from the religious sources. 
 As a result, Islamic law teachers must always decide whether the course will 
be taught from a faith-based or a critical perspective.  Ought we to adopt a 
different approach to teaching Islamic law on the basis that some of its sources 
are believed by Muslims to be the word of God from which no deviation is 
permitted? How far can the teaching and learning process in Islamic law 
critique these sources without breaking the boundaries of respect for religious 
text considered sacred and beyond debate by its adherents? Personally, I try to 
clarify these issues in the introductory session and make it clear that while in 
practice there is likely to be an overlap between what constitutes Islam, Shari’a, 
and Islamic law, my brief is to teach Islamic law.
Early in my experience teaching in non-Muslim jurisdictions, I learned to 
make very clear from the outset that this was an academic course on legal 
formulations inspired by the religion Islam as understood and developed by 
Muslim jurists and scholars over the centuries. It certainly has its particularities 
in that there is an inherent plurality within its jurisprudence lending itself 
to a variety of interpretations of the sources; hence the lack of uniformity 
of outcome in the form of laws derived thereof. But plurality within legal 
traditions is not confined to Islamic law, and the common law and civil law 
traditions also have multiple strains within their fabrics. I clarify the fact that I 
am not teaching a course on Islam as a religion, but I also acknowledge that no 
subject is taught in an ideological, social, or political vacuum. Thus teaching 
and learning Islamic law, like any other subject, is a political act and never 
24. I acknowledge Prof. Cammack’s assistance in sharpening the formulation of the questions 
posed.
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devoid of moral, ethical, social and political context. I am of course stating the 
obvious but herein lies the difficulty of teaching a subject which draws upon 
what followers of Islam believe to be the word of God, divine and immutable 
and beyond reproach or question. 
A further factor informing the instructor’s approach and the students’ 
expectations is where such a course or courses are housed. A cursory survey of 
existing courses on Islamic law in Muslim and non-Muslim western settings 
displays an uneven pattern. Courses offered in religious studies, theology or 
Islamic studies departments, and more likely to have Islamic Studies as a title, 
will be informed by the ethos and perspective of that discipline, and will have 
as their primary content the study of Islam as a religious tradition. 
A minority of courses on Islamic law, located in social science or law faculties, 
engage with the subject from a legal and/or socio-legal perspective, drawing 
upon primary and secondary sources as well as contemporary state practice. 
Such courses tend to present a combination of doctrine and application, 
highlighting theory and practice within the Islamic legal tradition as well 
as efforts at law reform in Muslim jurisdictions.25 Experiences informing the 
present paper are based upon courses housed in law schools in universities 
rather than institutions of Islamic studies and/or religious studies institutes 
imparting traditional Islamic education (in Muslim and non-Muslim settings). 
Teaching Islamic Law in Diverse Settings
Teaching Islamic law in a Muslim jurisdiction requires a different approach 
and methodology than one is able to adopt in non-Muslim jurisdictions. My 
teaching career in Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country,26 conditioned 
me to adopt a descriptive approach when teaching Islamic law and to refrain 
25. In the United Kingdom, SOAS has one of the most established offerings on Islamic law. 
At the undergraduate level, it offers some Islamic law courses as part of the LLB honours 
program as well as BA programs. At the postgraduate level, an MA in Islamic law is 
planned. For details visit http://www.soas.ac.uk/programmes/prog14037.php. At Warwick 
University, a successful undergraduate module on Islamic law and postgraduate levels has 
been offered for a number of years and is one of the few offered outside the London colleges. 
For details, see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/ug/store/modules/islamic_law. 
Other universities including University of East London (http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/
programs/undergraduate/LLBlaw.htm) offer an Introduction to Islamic Law as part of the 
LLB honors program and offer a range of courses including Islam and Human Rights, 
Islamic Legal Cultures and Islamic Legal Theories as part of the postgraduate curriculum. 
Hull University too, offers modules on Islamic Law at the LLB level. For details, visit http://
www.courses.hull.ac.uk/modules/0708S2/22148.html and http://www.courses.hull.ac.uk/
modules/0809S2/22163.html. The Law School at Exeter University offers Islamic Law and 
Society as part of its offerings in the postgraduate program. For details, visit http://www.
huss.ex.ac.uk/postgrad/module_template.php?ModID=ARAM151&ayrc=2007/8. This is 
not an exhaustive list but rather examples of the offerings on Islamic law in some United 
Kingdom universities. For details of courses on Islamic law in American law schools, see 
John Makdisi, A Survey of AALS Law Schools Teaching Islamic Law 55 J. Legal Educ. 
583–585 (2005).
26. I taught at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan for twenty-five years.
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from critiquing existing scholarship and textbooks. That is how I recollect 
being taught in the mid-1970s as a law student at the University of Peshawar, 
and that was my expectation as a student. Critical engagement, analysis, and 
discussion were simply beyond the pale unless one wanted to stir up trouble 
or acquire the label of infidel. Textbooks on Islamic law authored by highly 
reputable scholars (including D. F. Mulla27 and Abdur Rahim28) contain critical 
analysis on various aspects of Islamic law. Yet academics, including myself, 
navigated around points of contention between various schools of thought in 
order to avoid the need for independent thinking and critique.29 Of the three 
questions for analysis, the what, why, and how, lecturers would stop at what 
(descriptive/informative level of understanding concepts), and not venture 
further to interrogate why and how a certain principle of law was derived. This 
approach encouraged rote learning to the exclusion of questioning, debating, 
and arriving at an autonomous position.30 Criticism was considered an effort 
to undermine Islam itself and was a risky undertaking fraught with danger of 
the gravest kind, including being accused of blasphemy. 
A more compelling reason for not engaging rigorously with source materials 
in Muslim jurisdictions is an underlying tension between the scholarly and 
interpretative authority of the traditional Muslim scholar and a legal academic 
in a law school.31 Legal academics in western style universities are rarely accepted 
as interpretative authorities of the Islamic legal tradition due to their real or 
perceived lack of knowledge of Arabic and classical Islamic jurisprudence (usul-
ul-fiqh). The general public perception of faculty in public sector law schools 
27. D. F. Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law (M. A. Mannan, ed., PLD Publishers 1995). 
28. Rahim, supra note 3.
29. I periodically rebelled but was restrained under the able guidance of my senior professors 
who always had my best interests at heart. One incident remains in my memory after more 
than three decades: I was disturbed by gaps in historical and jurisprudential accounts of 
factors leading to establishment of the Sunni and Shia sects in Islam and the resultant 
diverging views on legal principles and law. My research led me to believe that this was 
a political rather than a religious/spiritual schism and asked why certain landmark events 
including the case of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad demanding her 
inheritance from the first caliph Abu Bakr, had been blocked from Sunni Muslim memory. 
My senior colleagues saved me from stirring up inter-sect violence and advised me to turn 
my attention to something less controversial. Another time I posed the question of how two 
persons involved in unlawful sexual relations could marry each other when their punishment 
was stoning to death? Or, how could mahr (dower) be described as a gift and mark of respect 
to the wife by the husband at the time of marriage when it was returnable if the wife sought 
release from the marital tie? 
30. Lectures were the main method of teaching and case law was rarely referred to. What I 
found deeply disturbing however, were textbooks on criminal law, including the Pakistan 
Penal Code and the Hudood laws, supposedly based upon principles of the Islamic legal 
tradition. The commentary and tone of the commentator/author was anything but gender 
sensitive.
31. The exception to this would be an Islamic law teacher at an Islamic university or Shari’a 
faculty.
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in Muslim jurisdictions is that they are lawyers not faqih (jurist); neither are 
they mufti (a person qualified to give fatwa or opinion). This perception may 
also be due to the fact that the colonial era “secularised” the legal academy by 
creating law schools within universities where a law degree was a prerequisite 
to entering the legal profession.32  Islamic law and jurisprudence was treated as 
one of many other courses and little attention was paid to developing research 
and methodological skills in this field. Concurrently this led to an undermining 
of the traditional institution of Islamic legal scholarship, the madrassa. A legal 
academic in most Muslim jurisdictions is thus restricted to lecturing from 
textbooks. Historically, the process whereby colonizers, occupying Muslim 
lands, replaced native laws (including Islamic law) with European ones is a 
well-documented, complex narrative. Ebrahim Moosa, for instance, recounts 
encounters between colonial and Islamic law.33 Similarly, the legal historian 
John Strawson presents incisive commentaries on how renowned western 
Islamic law scholars contributed to undermining Islamic law as part of the 
“civilizing” mission of colonizers.34
These experiences are shared by Ayesha Shahid and Mamman Lawan, my 
colleagues at Warwick University. Narrating experiences of his time as a law 
lecturer in Nigeria, Lawan35 stated that:
In Nigerian universities, the literature used is basically translations of the 
Qur’an and Hadith (teachings) of Prophet Mohammed, textbooks and articles 
mostly written by Arab, Asian or Nigerian Muslims a common feature of 
which is that they represent the classical point of view. They are descriptive. 
They give you the law as it is; they tell you that it has been made for you to 
obey; and they warn you that obedience is in your own interest both in this life 
and the life hereafter. In other words, teaching is based on the Islamic view 
of adherence to law as a form of worship rewarded in life after death. The law 
is regarded as either directly divine (when sourced from the Qur’an or Hadith) 
or it derives its authority from the divine sources (when formulated through 
secondary sources such as the views of Muslim jurists) and therefore must 
32. Fazlur Rahman, supra note 4; Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an 
Intellectual Tradition (Univ. of Chicago Press 1982); see also Ebrahim Moosa, Colonialism 
and Islamic Law, in Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates 158–81 (Muhammad 
Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore & Martin van Bruinessen, eds., Edinburgh Univ. Press 
2009).
33. Moosa, supra note 32, at 158.
34. John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law (Univ. of East London School of Law 
Publications, Media and Exhibition No. 1 1993), available at http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/
research/publications/islamiclaw.htm; John Strawson, Islamic Law and English Texts, 6 
Law and Critique 21–38 (1995).
35. Dr. Mamman Lawan completed his doctoral studies at the Law School, University of 
Warwick in 2009. He has taught Islamic law at Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria for a 
number of years.
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be obeyed as it is. It is simply a take-it-or-leave-it rule. Take two examples: 
Students are taught that theft attracts amputation of the arm as punishment 
once the conditions (such as custody and value) have been satisfied. Likewise, 
that men and women are equal save that due to the difference in their gender 
roles which is informed by their respective natures, men shall take twice the 
share of women in inheritance.36 
In comparison, Mamman sums up his experience of teaching Islamic law in 
the United Kingdom as follows:
In the UK, the (Islamic law) literature takes a different approach. It looks 
at the classical position in a wider context. It questions the applicability of 
Islamic public law in modern times particularly in the face of international 
human rights treaties which Muslim countries clamouring for the law are 
party to. It says for instance that amputation of the arm and other capital 
punishments are incompatible with “universal” human rights standards. And 
they describe as “discriminatory” against women the unequal inheritance 
shares, something which the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) frowns at. 
On a deeper level, you find further differences. In Nigerian universities for 
instance, the authority of the Qur’an and Hadith are unquestionable. In class, 
we boldly tell students that “the Holy Qur’an is the word of God, and the Hadith 
are the sayings, actions and approvals of the Prophet.” But in the UK, the 
practice is to say “the Koran is believed by Muslims to be the word of God, and 
Hadith is the sayings, actions and approvals credited to Mohammed.” I even 
came across literature which challenges the Hadith. For instance, a German 
scholar, Ignaz Goldziher, argues that the Hadith is not a reliable source of 
law because, according to him, it is the record of the views of early Muslims 
and not the teachings of the Prophet or even his companions; it is oral; later 
collections are larger than earlier ones; etc.37 In Nigeria, such literature cannot 
find its way into school curriculum.
It is not only the literature that is challenging. The students, some of whom are 
atheists or agnostics, asked questions on fundamental theological/legal issues 
which would hardly be asked in Nigeria. For instance, a student once asked 
me, “Does your God know the past, the present and the future?” to which, 
being Muslim, I replied, “Yes, He certainly does.” The student asked further: 
“Then why did He not provide for issues like human cloning in the Koran?” 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Qur’an was revealed more than 1,400 years 
ago and that human cloning is a new technology yet to come to fruition, this 
question could only be asked in western countries like the UK; to raise the 
same question in a country like Nigeria, is to challenge  the wisdom of God.
36. Mamman Lawan, Contrasting Two Teaching Experiences, Brief Contributed to the Islamic 
Law Curriculum Development Project (May 2008). I am grateful for this contribution.
37. M.Z. Siddiqi, Hadith Literature. Its Origin, Development and Special Features (Islamic 
Texts Society 1993). 
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Ayesha Shahid38 describes the approach she had to adopt when lecturing on 
Islamic law at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan and how it differed from 
her experience of teaching the subject in the United Kingdom.
As part of the teaching team for the Islamic family law module, what I 
have enjoyed most is the academic freedom in designing and teaching the 
curriculum…. If I compare the teaching method followed at Warwick with 
the method of teaching Islamic law in Pakistan I would say that there is a huge 
difference between the two (not so much in terms of contents or major topics) 
and definitely in terms of approach and teaching methodology. The course in 
Pakistan does not invoke a critical evaluation of the subject. Any questioning 
of the subject amounts to challenging religious law which is unacceptable to 
conservative Muslims. As a result the course fails to generate an analytical 
approach among students and lack of critique and analysis is clearly visible in 
lectures delivered.39
I too can report that teaching Islamic law in non-Muslim jurisdictions has 
been a more challenging, intellectually engaging and rewarding experience. 
Students, mindful of the fact that this law is informed by Islam, formulate 
critical questions in a respectful and mature fashion—something that a student 
in a Muslim jurisdiction would never contemplate. The curriculum as well as 
the teaching methods reflect this approach resulting in a fruitful intellectual 
exchange.
From a pedagogical perspective, I often adopt a comparative law approach 
when dealing with some issues in my Islamic law teaching. This arises due to 
the different normative frameworks on which the Islamic legal tradition and 
western legal systems are based. An important point is to give equal weight and 
emphasis to both. One of the most challenging and eye-opening comments I 
received in my feedback on the Islamic Law course at Warwick University, was 
the following: 
The module was very interesting and I enjoyed the subject matter…. My 
key concern was that we weren’t challenged to view the law from an Islamic 
viewpoint. Instead, we were seeing it from the western eye, which made it 
seem antiquated or even wrong.
This comment stunned me because I had never considered either the 
content or the delivery to reflect these views, but the student’s comment rang 
alarm bells. On closer inspection, I realized that unconsciously, as western 
academics, we tend to use a western knowledge system, both in substance 
38. Shahid is a lecturer at the Law School, University of Hull. She was previously a doctoral 
candidate and Islamic law tutor at the Law School, University of Warwick, and before that, 
a lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, Pakistan.
39. Ayesha Shahid, Islamic Law Teaching, Brief contributed to the Islamic Law Curriculum 
Development Project (May 2008). I am grateful for the contribution.
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and procedure, as our reference point when teaching Islamic law. Thus, when 
engaging with concepts and institutions of family law, for instance, we consider 
monogamous marriage as the standard form while polygamous unions are 
considered freakish or immoral. The starting point in many textbooks as well 
as teaching sessions is the oft-repeated definition of marriage in Hyde v. Hyde, 
where marriage is stated to be the union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others. Islamic family law students from western jurisdictions 
therefore approach and judge polygamy from their moral, ethical standpoint 
and find it difficult to engage with discussion around the Qur’anic verses on the 
subject.
Consciously or unconsciously, we find ourselves trapped in an Orientalist 
discourse on Islamic law, its origins, and doctrine, wherein lies a constant 
positioning of legal norms vis-à-vis each other.40 At best, in our conversations 
with students, we are trying to present Islamic laws as modern and progressive 
and not pre-modern and backward; hence the remark of my undergraduate 
tutee who picked up on this defensive comparative approach, discarding it as 
completely uncalled for.
In order to create a mutually beneficial discourse, one must consider the 
extent to which western scholarship has engaged with Muslim scholarship. 
Barring a few exceptions, knowledge of Muslim theorists, jurists and 
philosophers is rare in the western world. In the few cases where there has 
been an engagement with Islamic legal tradition, it has been through the 
eyes of a post enlightenment western liberal tradition as well as an Orientalist 
standpoint. For example, Hadith as a source of law has been of interest to western 
scholars of Islamic law for over 200 years. Siddiqi states that “[w]hile some 
have accepted the traditional canons of Hadith criticism developed by Muslim 
scholars themselves, others have offered alternative accounts of the subject.” 
Ignaz Goldziher, Alfred Guillame, Joseph Schacht and others attempt to 
discredit Hadith literature as a valid source of Islamic law by questioning its 
very foundation.41 Dialogue between a comparative perspective of Islamic 
law and its western counterpart must be among equals. However, this type 
of meaningful discourse has been conspicuously absent.42 As Edward Said 
remarks: “The essence of this tradition is to subject Islamic law to European 
40. For an incisive analysis, see Wael B. Hallaq, The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic 
Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse, 2 UCLA J. Islamic & Near East Law 1 (2002).
41. Mohammad Z. Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: Its Origins, Development and Special Features 
124 (Islamic Texts Society 1993). For a concise summary of these authors’ viewpoints, see id. 
at Appendix II, 124–35.
42. Shaheen Sardar Ali, Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in Europe: 
Some Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus in Religious 
Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe 57–59, 61 (Titia Leonon & Jenny E Goldschmidt 
eds., Intersentia 2007).
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intellectual judgement, by seizing the ‘superior location’ made available by 
European power.”43
Some suggested steps in teaching Islamic law include the following:
• First, clarify the difference between Islam (as a religion and faith), and 
Islamic law as a human articulation and endeavour, albeit informed 
by the Islamic religion. I adopt a “law in context” approach for which 
Warwick University Law School has always been well known in UK 
academia and beyond.44 Since every verse of the Qur’an and every Hadith 
has a historical context, it is important to appreciate the context in 
order to understand, critique, and interrogate the law based on these 
sources. Further, while Muslims consider every word of the Qur’an as the 
word of God, the same cannot be said of every word of every Hadith or 
indeed the secondary sources of law, i.e., ijma amd qiyas (or other juristic 
techniques including ijtihad, taqlid, talfiq, and takhayyur). Therefore, 
reading a primary source and a secondary source of Islamic law in their 
respective contexts is integral to its understanding of how a particular 
point of law was derived. I also make the point that there is no single 
monolithic version of what constitutes “true” Islamic law. There are 
many diverse interpretations. Equal legitimacy and acceptance must be 
accorded to the various sects (Sunni and Shia) as well as schools of 
juristic thought in Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali). 
• As an application of the above principle, I use Qur’anic verses as the 
starting point for our discussion on a range of themes (e.g., marriage, 
dower, divorce, custody, guardianship, inheritance, succession). We 
then look at various codified laws in contemporary Muslim jurisdictions 
supposedly based on these verses of the Qur’an. 
• Because the woman question is so central in any discussion on Islam 
and Islamic law, it is important to consciously adopt a gender-sensitive 
perspective throughout the course and in analyzing how various laws 
came about in the Islamic legal tradition.
• Assessments are also based on the methodology above. For instance, 
in a critique of laws on dissolution of marriage, Qur’anic verses are the 
starting point of our discussion. We then formulate possible drafts of 
legislation based on the Qur’anic verses and analyze existing legislation 
from various Muslim jurisdictions questioning the extent to which 
these match the Qur’anic verses on the subject.45  
43. Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage 1978). 
44. The “law in context” approach meant that in order to understand the law, it was important 
to study it within its context including the social, political, economic, moral and ethical 
dimensions. It was differentiated from a black letter approach to which many law schools 
subscribed. In the 21st century however, things have moved on and most law schools believe 
themselves to be “contextual” in their approach to legal studies.
45. For detailed examples, see our teaching manual entitled An Introduction to Islamic 
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• We also explore the extent to which a principle of law is actually a 
religious injunction and the degree to which it is derived from culture, 
custom, and tradition of a given social context. 
• Finally, a section of the course is devoted to exploring contemporary 
issues in Islamic law arising from technological and social developments 
affecting Muslims in a global environment. These themes and topics 
differ from year to year and include surrogacy and its implications and 
responses from within the Islamic legal tradition; presenting DNA 
evidence of parentage in a court of law; human milk banks and impact 
on rules of prohibited degrees of relationship in marriage among 
Muslims; minimum and maximum periods of gestation in order to 
establish paternity (and legitimacy). 
Why a “Law in Context” and Comparative Approach?
It is necessary for Islamic Law teaching to adopt a “law in context” 
approach where the meaning of law is understood and explored in its wider 
social, economic, political, ethical and moral sense and not confined to a 
reading of the text as a formal, written piece of legislation. Additionally, and 
more importantly, any question on Islamic law is open to more than one legal 
response and, barring a few exceptions, more than one set of laws may well 
be extrapolated from the same sources. The success of any course on Islamic 
law depends on a number of front-loaded inputs. For instance, the opening 
teaching sessions would be well spent on a concise overview of sources of the 
Islamic legal tradition against the backdrop of the Sunni-Shia schism and the 
evolution of the schools of juristic thought i.e., Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and 
Hanbali in the Sunni madhab, and Athna-Ashariya, Ismailia, and Zaidya in 
the Shia sect. An additional challenge in non-Muslim jurisdictions where the 
student population taking Islamic Law has no prior knowledge of or exposure 
to Arabic or Islam, is the need for a glossary of terms with English translation. 
I adopt the practice of writing every new Arabic word used in class on the 
board, reading it aloud and asking the class to repeat after me. One member 
of the class volunteers to make notes to develop our own little Arabic/English 
class dictionary which we revise before every class. It is inspiring to hear 
enthusiastic attempts at reading words in a foreign language reverberating in 
an otherwise all-English environment.  
Any course on Islamic law must present a comprehensive history of the 
primary and secondary sources of what constitutes Islamic law as well as juristic 
techniques employed in the classical period of its evolution. Introducing 
students to traditional methodology of usul-ul-fiqh need not be done to the 
exclusion of illustrative examples of diverse interpretations of the same source. 
One of the initial class assignments could be as follows: How do we use the 
Family Law, available at http://www.ukcle.ac.uk/resources/teaching-and-learning-strategies/
islamiclaw/. 
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Qur’an as a source on which to construct a law of evidence? After compiling 
relevant Qur’anic verses on the subject, the student takes into consideration the 
historical and cultural context of the verse and tries to determine the factors 
leading to a certain law on the subject. Further, it is important for the student 
to understand the principles of naskh, or abrogation, and its impact on law-
making. The Qur’an was revealed over a period of almost twenty-three years 
and on more than one occasion, a later verse abrogated an earlier verse where 
a different law/regulation/injunction or exhortation was made. It is important 
to bear this in mind when developing a law based on a verse(s) of the Qur’an. 
Last, but not least, the student should engage the various interpretations of 
a particular set of verses by different schools of juristic thought as well as 
scholars belonging to Shia and Sunni sects. 
Examples of divergent rules of law may be introduced early on in the course 
as well as through small group seminars and class assignments. For instance, 
Sunni schools of thought consider the triple talaq (divorce pronouncement) 
as reprehensible yet legally valid as opposed to the Shia sect that considers it 
non-binding and invalid.46 What is the basis for arriving at such diametrically 
opposed conclusions, and how is this divergence explained in Islamic legal 
methodology?47 Below are examples of possible case studies in an Islamic law 
course.
Islamic Criminal Justice: Case Study 1
We might begin by sharing the genesis of Islamic criminal law on extramarital 
sexual relationships (zina), its definition, evidentiary rule, and punishment. 
Students are asked to follow all the relevant verses in the Qur’an and construct 
a legally enforceable rule and compare it with existing legislation in some 
Muslim countries. The Qur’an punishes extramarital sexual relations along a 
spectrum, from declaring such behavior a moral and legal transgression and 
punishable as tazir to making it a hadd offense triggering harsh mandatory 
punishments.48 Verse 17:32 of the Qur’an prescribes thus: “And do not go near 
46. Talaq means dissolution of marriage at the husband’s initiative. In the Islamic legal tradition 
this dissolution has to follow certain procedures offering space for reconciliation. These 
modes of giving talaq (divorce) may either be the ahsan mode where one pronouncement 
follows abstinence from the wife for a specified period of time during which there is the 
opportunity for the couple to resume marital relations. Next is the hasan mode of divorce 
where the husband pronounces talaq thrice in three consecutive months without any sexual 
relations with his wife for the duration of this time. Here again there is an opportunity for 
resuming marital relations until the end of the third month. The triple talaq however is a 
summary talaq whereby the husband divorces his wife by three pronouncements in a single 
sitting with no room for reconciliation. This method is known as bida or innovation and  is 
frowned upon yet considered legally acceptable.
47. Kecia Ali, Women, Gender, and Islamic Law: Teaching About Classical Doctrine, Court 
Practice, and Contemporary Legal Reform, available at http://www.aarweb.org/meetings/
Annual_Meeting/Past_and_Future_Meetings/2001/abstracts.asp.
48. Muhammed Selim El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law 15 (American Trust Publications 
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fornication (zina) as it is immoral and an evil way.” No particular punishment 
was prescribed at this stage.
Chapter 4 of the Qur’an entitled An-Nisa (Women) declares that, “If any 
of your women Are guilty of lewdness, Take the evidence of four (Reliable) 
witnesses from among you Against them; and if they testify, Confine them to 
houses until Death do claim them, Or Allah ordain them Some (other) way.”49 
The students may read the above verses as applicable to zina where the 
prescribed punishment is imprisonment. This verse may also be termed as 
a precursor to the stricter hadd punishment.50 But, as in other Quran’ic verses, 
there is space for atonement and forgiveness.
Chapter 24 of the Qur’an goes on to create the hadd offence of zina and 
prescribe punishment as follows:
The woman and the man Guilty of adultery or fornication, Flog each of them 
With a hundred stripes; Let not compassion move you In their case, in a 
matter Prescribed by Allah and the Last Day: And let a party Of the Believers 
Witness their punishment.... Let no man guilty of Adultery or fornication 
marry Any but a woman Similarly guilty, or an Unbeliever, Nor let any but 
such a man Or an unbeliever Marry such a woman: To the Believers such a 
thing Is forbidden.51 
Here the students are likely to raise questions on how and why some 
contemporary Muslim jurisdictions prescribe stoning to death as punishment 
when none appears in the primary source, i.e., the Qur’an. 
Finally, verses of the Qur’an relating to evidence may be incorporated into 
the discussion as well as the linkage between qadfh and zina. Another step is 
to link this case study with the hadd offence of qadfh or wrongful allegation 
testimony implicating a person for zina. 
In this regard, students note that the Qur’an states: 
And those who launch A charge against chaste women, And produce not four 
witnesses (To support their allegation), Flog them with eighty stripes; And 
reject their evidence Ever after: for such men Are wicked transgressors; Unless 
they repent thereafter And mend (their conduct): For Allah is Oft-Forgiving, 
Most Merciful. Those who slander chaste, indiscreet but believing women, 
are cursed in this life and in the hereafter: For them is grievous penalty. On 
the Day when their tongues, their hands, and their feet will bear witness 
against them as to their actions, on that day God will pay them back (all) 
1993).
49. Qur’an 4:15.
50. However, Abdullah Yusaf Ali in his commentary of the Qur’an makes the point that verse 4:15 
addresses homosexuality and not zina between a male and female.
51. Qur’an 24:2–3.
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their just dues, and they will realise that God is the (very) Truth, that makes 
all things manifest.52 
A contextual analysis of the Qur’anic text raises the question of what brought 
about the harsh statement towards extramarital sexual activity and more so to 
allegations and insinuations thereof? The above verses were revealed following 
the famous “Affair of the Necklace” in which the Prophet Mohammad’s wife 
Aisha was inadvertently left behind by a caravan in the desert as she went 
searching for her necklace that had gone missing. She was spotted by one of 
the young, single men in the Prophet’s entourage and brought back to Medina 
leading to widespread rumours about her time alone with this man. The 
subsequent weeks turned into a nightmare for Aisha as her honor and dignity 
had come under question and she was suspected of inappropriate behaviour. 
The verse, therefore, unambiguously silenced rumors against not only Aisha 
but for future generations of women and proceeded to prescribe a very harsh 
punishment for a person or persons who attempt to slander a woman’s good 
name.53
Read together and in light of the verses’ context, it is evident that the 
focus of the pronouncements was to safeguard women’s reputation and not 
spread rumors regarding extramarital relationships. In fact, the Qur’an advises 
people to walk away from a place where rumor mongering or impropriety (of 
behavior) is rife.54 
A contextual reading of the primary sources of Islamic law thus provides 
a base upon which to build student skills for later parts of the course when 
we discuss legal reform in the Muslim world.55 The case study also offers an 
opportunity to challenge the entire situation (offense and punishment) in the 
context of contemporary international human rights law.
52. Qur’an 24:4–5, 23–25.
53. See Qur’an 24:13–19 (“Why did they not bring Four witnesses to prove it? When they have not 
brought The witnesses, such men, In sight of Allah, (Stand forth) themselves as liars! Were 
it not for the grace And mercy of Allah on you, In this world and the Hereafter, A grievous 
penalty would have Seized you in that ye rushed Glibly into this affair. Behold, ye received it 
On your tongues, And said out of your mouths Things of which he had No knowledge; and 
ye thought It to be a light matter, While it was most serious In the sight of Allah. And why 
did ye not, When ye heard it, say—‘It is not right of us To speak of this: Glory to Allah! This 
is A most serious slander!’ Those who love (to see) Scandal published broadcast Among the 
Believers, will have A grievous Penalty in this life And in Hereafter: Allah Knows, and ye 
know not.”).
54. Qur’an 24:16–17.
55. For this example, I have used my chapter entitled, Shaheen Sardar Ali, Interpretative 
Strategies for Women’s Human Rights in a Plural Legal Framework: Exploring Judicial 
and State Responses to Hudood Laws in Pakistan, in Human Rights, Plural Legalities and 
Gendered Realities: Paths Are Made by Walking, at 381–406 (Anne Hellum, Shaheen Sardar 
Ali, Julie Stewart & Amy Tsanga eds., Weaver Press 2007).
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Gender-Sensitive Islamic Law Curriculum: Case Study 2
Women are and always have been at the center of the discourse in Islamic 
legal scholarship. This is true both within Muslim communities as well 
as in the non-Muslim world. I agree with Kecia Ali who states that Islamic 
law is a valuable resource to teach about women and gender in Islam.56 For 
both detractors and proponents of Islam/Muslims, Islamic law becomes the 
barometer on which gender equality is measured. Again, the major challenge 
here is to differentiate between sources of Islamic law, in particular its primary 
sources, on the one hand, and the Islamic legal tradition on the other. Both 
are perceived as static and uniform, belying the dynamism and variation 
inherent in Islamic law. This flawed perception legitimates unequal gender 
relations and the inherent superiority of men. Thus, some Qur’anic verses are 
cited as markers of this inequality and generalized as an integral component of 
Islamic law. Examples include the evidentiary value of a woman’s testimony, 
polygamy, physical chastisement of a wife by her husband, unilateral right of 
a Muslim husband to divorce his wife, and so on.
A gender sensitive approach to Islamic law challenges this worldview, 
arguing that the text on which discriminatory laws are based is open to 
more than one interpretation. Thus in discussing the verses of the Qur’an on 
polygamy, we attempt to adopt a holistic approach by also placing on the table 
as it were, the provisos that would require incorporation into any law allowing 
polygamy. Students are asked to consider the text on polygamy addressing the 
following questions:
• Is polygamy a mandatory religious obligation for a Muslim male? 
• Is polygamy the rule or the exception in the Qur’an?
• If it is the exception, what are the precedent conditions to a polygamous 
marriage?
• How might these conditions form part of a law in the contemporary 
sense of the term?
• What if any or all of the conditions are not followed? What is the status 
of such a marriage: Is it valid, void or voidable?
Raising these issues opens up possibilities for legal debate and legislation 
more sensitive to women and challenges the oft-repeated views that the Qur’an 
accords a free hand to men for multiple marriages.
A further example of a gender sensitive approach to teaching Islamic law 
consists of expanding the discursive terrain of what constitutes law-making 
in the Islamic legal tradition. With the help of concrete examples, one can 
highlight the sterility of maintaining an inflexible attitude to the process of 
56. Kecia Ali, supra note 47.
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law making in Muslim jurisdictions as well as its application to Muslims in 
non-Muslim jurisdictions. In my teaching, I attempt to take students through 
a journey from Shari’a as principles of the Islamic legal tradition to siyasa Shari’a, 
or legislative enactments by the political authority of the state, and onwards 
to qanun or enforceable law, pointing out at various stages the distance from 
the divine and consequently the proximity of human intervention in the 
domain of law making. Law making is a human effort at interpreting and 
understanding the divine text and must be distinguished from the text, and 
subsequent generations of Muslim communities ought not to be held hostage 
to these time bound articulations. 
There are many examples of that flexibility, most prominently those 
interpretations impacting women’s rights.57 Verse 2.282 of the Qur’an provides 
an example where pronouncements of arguably restricted application are used 
as justification for creating gender hierarchies within the Islamic tradition. We 
refer to the laws of evidence as an example where students are able to debate 
the contextual setting of the Qur’anic verses, relevant hadith on the subject, 
and its potential legislative formulations in contemporary times. A number 
of Muslim jurisdictions including Pakistan have legislated on the basis of 
Verse 2.282, thus legally reducing the status of women.58 The verse states 
that the testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man in written financial 
transactions: 
And get two witnesses,
Out of your own men,
And if there are not two men,
Then a man and two women,
Such as ye choose,
For witnesses,
So that if one of them errs,
The other can remind her.
57. For example in the area of Hadd laws supposedly derived from the Qur’an, see id.; Aasifa 
Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-
Sensitive Perspective, 18 Michigan J. Int’l Law 287–320 (1997); H R Kusha, The Sacred Law 
of Islam. A Case Study of Women’s Treatment in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Criminal 
Justice System (Ashgate Pub. Ltd. 2002); Asma Jehangir & Hina Jilani, The Hudood 
Ordinances: A Divine Sanction? (Rohtas Books 1990).
58. Section 17 of the Qanoon-i-Shahadat Order, 1984.
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Students are required to read views, opinions, and commentaries of scholars 
on the subject. Fazlur Rahman, for instance, believes that this verse is not 
stating any general law of the evidentiary value of male and female statements:
If the Qur’an did really regard a woman’s evidence as half that of a man’s, why 
should it not allow the evidence of four females to be equivalent to that of 
two males and why should it say that only one of the males may be replaced 
by two females? The intention of the Qur’an apparently was that since it is a 
question of financial transaction and since women usually do not deal with 
such matters or with business affairs in general, it would be better to have two 
women rather than one—if one had to have women—and that, if possible at all, 
one must have at least one male.59
Fazlur Rahman then goes on to state that one cannot simply deduce from 
Verse 2:282 a general law that under all circumstances and for all purposes, a 
woman’s evidence is inferior to a man’s. He is convinced that this verse does 
not at all prove any rational deficiency in women vis-à-vis men. As an example, 
he cites classical Islamic law which regards women with knowledge of 
gynecology as the most competent witnesses in cases involving gynecological 
issues.60 Finally, he also suggests that even if a law could be formulated on 
the basis of such generalizations there is compelling reason to change the law 
when social circumstances change, such as when women and men are equally 
educated and conversant with business and financial transactions.61
Rahman’s is a minority view and students often find it hard to find similar 
gender sensitive interpretations, posing a formidable challenge to developing 
a balanced Islamic law curriculum. 
Language/Competence of Non-Arabic Speaking Instructors
To what extent is English language scholarship adequately representative 
of the richness of the Islamic legal tradition? The answer is complex. Barring 
some honorable exceptions, the English-language scholarship is doctrinal 
and one discerns elements of what Said describes as Orientalism among some 
European writers on the subject. The well-known works of Ignaz Goldziher, 
Joseph Schacht, and others relating to Hadith as a source of Islamic law are 
examples of this trend that have only lately seen robust challenge.62 Until 
recently, there were few non-western Islamic law scholars writing in English, 
so students drawing upon English language scholarship were mostly unaware 
of different aspects and perspectives to this debate. 
Is a non-Muslim competent to teach Islamic law? I had not given this much 
thought until a couple of years ago when a colleague asked the question. I 
59. Fazlur Rahman, Status of Women in the Qur’an, in Women and Revolution in Iran 42 
(GuityNashat ed., Westview Press 1983). 
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. This challenge has been mounted by, among others, Wael B. Hallaq, supra note 40.
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responded that Islamic law is part of legal scholarship and so long as the tutor 
is competent to teach the subject, the question of religious belief ought not 
to apply. Is knowledge of Arabic an essential pre-requisite for teaching and 
learning Islamic law due to the fact that the Qur’an, Hadith, and most of the 
legal scholarship is in Arabic? The answer is complex and inclusive. Ideally, 
the primary sources ought to be read and understood in the original language, 
yet following the spread of Islam, non-Arab Muslims (except for the few who 
learned the language) relied on translations of the Qur’an and Ahadith. This 
automatically produced various understandings of the more complex aspects 
of the law. Although not explicitly stated, an on-going debate exists among 
scholars and the laity as to whether a hierarchy of knowledge had been created 
by virtue of the language in which it is generated. Some Islamic law scholars 
believe that the highest form of knowledge is generated by Arabic speaking 
scholars and a lower one by those who access it through translations. Thus, 
some Arab speaking Muslim scholars applauded the contemporariness of 
the Qur’an and Arabic “…because the categories of grammar, lexicography, 
syntax and redaction of the Qur’anic text, and those of Arabic consciousness 
embedded in the Arabic language have not changed through the centuries. 
This phenomenon is indeed unique….”63 
Others, including An-Naim, remind us that “The Qur’an was revealed in 
Arabic, which is a human language that evolved in its own specific historical 
context, and many verses of the Qur’an were addressing specific situations 
in the daily lives of early Muslims at that time (610–632 CE) in their local 
context of western Arabia.”64 This suggests that knowledge of Arabic does not 
necessarily imply superior understanding of the Qur’anic text.
While the primacy of Arabic in Islamic law scholarship can be debated, it 
is evident that understanding the Qur’an and Hadith from the Arabic text or 
through translations by a diverse community of Muslims around the world has 
implications for the teaching and learning of Islamic law in English speaking 
and non-Arab Muslim jurisdictions. Teaching Islamic law from translated 
material means that one must, in the interest of objectivity, include a range 
of translations. Which one is more faithful to the original text and how does 
one construct an argument for a particular rule of law based on the Qur’an 
and Hadith? I would argue however that, even if one were teaching from the 
original Arabic text, that too would be susceptible to more than one meaning. 
After all, English (or French or German) legal texts may similarly be debated 
and different variants of interpretations derived.
63. I. R. Al-Faruqi, Islam and Other Faiths, in The Challenge of Islam 85 (Altaf Gauhar ed., 
Islamic Council of Europe 1978).
64. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, Global Citizenship and Human Rights: From Muslims in 
Europe to European Muslims 11 (Intersentia 2006) (inaugural address as professor to the 
W.G. Wiarda Chair, Utrecht University).
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Challenges and Issues and the Way Forward
The restrictive approach towards Islamic law due to its source in divine 
texts spills over into the teaching of Islamic law in non-Muslim jurisdictions 
but from a different perspective. Popular understandings of Islam and Islamic 
law as doctrinal, fossilized, and backward looking tend to be the prism 
through which Islamic legal scholarship in English is read, understood and 
contextualized. A number of responses may help dispel these notions. For 
instance, an Islamic Law course is not like western courses in contracts, trusts 
or banking law and so on, because Islamic law is not statute law and thus has 
no single definitive content. Teaching Islamic law thus means teaching a range 
of possible rules on a particular topic based on the interpretation of those 
rules employed to resolve problems arising in various spheres of life. Although 
in recent years, codification of some areas of Islamic law has occurred, the 
vast corpus of Islamic law continues to be taught and applied as “principles 
of law” rather than “the law.” The method Muslim jurisdictions use to apply 
Islamic law principles, rather than statutes, and the mechanism by which a 
jurist arrives at a particular understanding of law, needs wider publication. 
Students also need exposure to a broader Islamic law curriculum. I have 
often worried about the exclusion of Islamic court procedures and experiences 
in the curriculum, but some scholars have begun to fill this gap including 
Tucker’s65 meticulous collection of qadi courts during the Ottoman period, 
Moors’s66 and Welchman’s67 work on women and property rights in Palestine, 
and Shahram’s68 and Sonbol’s69 work on family courts in the Middle East. 
These records show Islamic law in action and are fascinating examples of how 
women in particular articulated and obtained their rights through courts by 
using Islamic law.
A further initiative might be to obtain and translate, from both Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries, actual examples of marriage contracts with stipulations 
made by women, be it for dower amounts, place of residence after marriage, 
restricting the husband’s power to pronounce talaq, and so on. I believe this 
primary source documentation of Islamic law in action would breathe life into 
a mundane reading of requirements of a valid marriage contract. 
65. Judith E. Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and 
Palestine (Univ. of Calif. Press 1998). 
66. Annelies Moors, Women, Property and Islam: Palestinian Experiences, 1920–1990 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
67. Lyn Welchman, The Development of Islamic Family Law in the Legal System of Jordan, 37 
Int’l and Comp. L. Q. 868–86 (1988).
68. Ron Shahram, Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt: A Study Based on Decisions by the 
Shari’a Courts, 1900–1955 (Brill Academic Pub. 1997).
69. Women, The Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History (Amera El Azhary Sonbol ed., 
Syracuse Univ. Press 1996).
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English language scholarship is increasing at a commendable pace, yet far 
more work is required to enhance existing offerings. More importantly, broader 
use of translated materials from various languages would better represent the 
diversity of the Islamic legal tradition.
Another challenge is to develop high quality teaching and learning 
resources in a range of Islamic law modules, not simply those confined to 
Muslim family law. Most institutions limit themselves to a family law course 
where there is abundant literature, and this passes as Islamic law in toto. The 
United Kingdom Council of Legal Education (UKCLE), the University of 
Warwick,70 and the Commonwealth Legal Education Association through 
an Islamic Law Curriculum Development Project have developed a number 
of teaching manuals as well as a glossary of Arabic/English words and a 
bibliography. This is work in progress and we hope to expand and enrich these 
resources to encourage and support teachers of Islamic law globally.
There is an unmet need for a degree in Islamic law, as distinguished from 
Islamic studies, in western institutions of higher education. For instance, major 
financial institutions in a number of non-Muslim countries are now training 
their staff to do business with oil-producing Muslim jurisdictions, generating 
significant new interest in Islamic finance and banking law. As a consequence, 
related areas of Islamic law including family law, human rights, Zakat, social 
welfare law, criminal justice, and Islamic international law, to name a few, 
are also in significant demand in the west. In the present global political and 
social climate, where discomfort and distrust of Islam and Muslims is at an 
alarmingly high level, including Islamic law in the list of law school offerings 
would present an opportunity to engage firsthand with the Islamic legal 
tradition. For most law students in western universities, this would likely be 
their first and perhaps only interaction with Islamic law, or indeed Islam and 
Muslims, and a chance to dispel pre-conceived notions. I see this happening 
every time I walk into my Islamic law class. Islamic legal scholarship as a 
rigorous discipline may yet be the bridge where the “twain may meet” after all! 
70. In the United Kingdom, I have had the privilege of leading this project and am happy 
to report that there is now an impressive collection of teaching materials on a range of 
Islamic law courses on the UKCLE website accessible to interested teachers, students and 
researchers.
